

EXHIBIT No. 13

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Place extension number Op 12 Feb. 1918	Address	Message procedure
From CNO Rumored by Japan Date, October 14, 1941	For action CINCPAC CINCPAC CINCPAC (ACKNOWLEDGE)	Priority X Immediate Deferred
For information Rumored by Transmitted by	Information	Priority Immediate Deferred

Indicate by asterisk address for which such delivery is satisfactory.

NOTE. OTHER

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred procedure. Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery.

Text.—The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation X If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly Nationalistic and anti American X If the Komei Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third adms inform appropriate Army and naval district authorities. Acknowledge.

EXHIBIT No. 14

Cinpac File No.
HRS-1

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Pearl Harbor, T. H., October 22, 1941.

Secret

DEAR BETTY: On receipt of your despatches following the change in the Japanese cabinet we made the following dispositions:—

Continued to maintain the patrol of two Submarines at Midway.

Despatched twelve patrol planes to Midway.

Despatched two submarines to Wake. They will arrive there on 23 October.

Despatched the CASTOR and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with additional marines, ammunition and stores.

The CURTISS arrives at Wake on 21 October with gas, lube oil and bombs.

Prepared to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, replacing the six at Midway from Pearl Harbor.

Despatched additional marines to Palmyra.

Placed Admiral Pye, with the ships making a health cruise, on twelve hours notice after 20 October.

Had six submarines prepared to depart for Japan on short notice.

Put some additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor.

Delayed the sailing of the WEST VIRGINIA unit about 17 November when she is due to go for an overhaul to Puget Sound and deferred final decision until that time.

With minor changes I propose to continue the health cruises to the Pacific Coast until something more definite develops. The despatch in regard to the submarines for Manila went forward to you today.

I previously pointed out to you the great desirability of things in the Pacific Fleet. If you will bear with me I want to repeat some of them once more. The

urgency for additional [copy not legible] craft in this area is as great as ever. Such craft are not worthwhile unless they can operate in trade wind seas which result from winds from 15 to 35 knots blowing almost continually. The 12 PT's which you sent to us I fear will be of very little use in this area. We sent them on an average day to make a trip from Cabu to Molokai. The reports of this trip have gone forward officially. They were practically useless in this sea and could not make more than 10 knots. Several of them had to turn back and a few personnel were quite seriously injured from being thrown about. We need something much more substantial to be of any use out here. In this connection I noted that the Department diverted the listening gear allocated to the four-stackers (DM's) in this Fleet to Atlantic destroyers and we will get no listening gear for these craft until a new contract is made. I had fondly hoped that all these craft would be fitted with listening gear by the first of December.

In order to get anything like the capabilities of the heavy ships of this Fleet made effective we require at least two more squadrons of destroyers. Every exercise we plan we find the destroyers are lacking. You can well understand of course, that two squadrons is, in my opinion, a very modest request. We can use many more.

I have been struggling with the availability of battleships and am concerned about the long interval between overhauls that will result if we continue to have only one battleship overhauled at one time. I am loath to reduce the operational forces by more than that particularly as the interim availability further reduces the number available for operations. Two more battleships out here, particularly if they could be the NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON would ease the situation enormously. We have indications that one new battleship has been commissioned by the Japanese and rumors that an additional one will soon be placed in commission. Such a contingency will further disturb the balance of power in the Pacific.

We can use all the long range submarines that you can send us. They can be most effective in keeping destroyers and other patrol craft occupied near the Japanese bases, homeland, and trade routes.

We should have more cruisers because we can expect that Jap raider activities will result from employment of a considerable number of converted merchant types as well as old cruisers in this work. Then, too, our own planned offensive operations require cruisers and more cruisers. The least you can do for us is to leave us with the cruisers we have. I can easily keep three or four more divisions profitably occupied when war breaks.

The type of operations we have planned in the early stages of the war puts a premium on aircraft operations from carriers. We have only three. One of them is occupied part-time in training activities at San Diego. I note in a letter signed by Ingersoll and received today that the chances of getting a merchant ship converted to a carrier for training purposes at San Diego are very poor. I feel that this matter should be pushed; that we should have at least one such vessel in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. Until we do get such a ship we are required to occupy a considerable time of a carrier at greatly increased cost, diversion from active operations and reduction in the efficiency of the carrier. These carrier training vessels will be useful so long as the war lasts and will pay for themselves many times over.

We had information some time ago that you were converting two sea train vessels for use in transporting aircraft. What has become of them? Are they operating in the Atlantic and so you propose to send one of these to the Pacific? If so—when? We still find it necessary to send a carrier to San Diego to ferry planes.

I feel that the training in the Fleet is coming along very well. The shooting so far has been very good by any standards. We are developing the use of radar and our principal handicap at the present time is lack of material and lack of trained personnel. Both are being remedied at a satisfactory rate. We have had no experience yet with the use of gunnery radar. The first sets are now being installed. The gunnery radar installed in the HONOLULU Class is a bitter disappointment. They have been able to get surface ships at ranges not in excess of twenty thousand yards, on a big ship, and around twelve thousand on a destroyer. This radar is apparently useless for the detection of aircraft. Luckily, this type is being installed in the HONOLULU Class only. It is useful only for short range work against surface craft at night or in low visibility. I presume steps are being taken to eliminate or radically improve this type of radar.

The radar installed in the battleships and carriers is well worthwhile and we have got highly creditable results from its use.

The new big drydock here has been pumped out and the contractors' forces are now in process of cleaning it out preparatory to finishing off the bottom. I am informed that an emergency docking will be possible any time after about the 15th of November, although the dock will not be entirely completed until sometime later than that.

The recreation facilities are being added to and I believe the men are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The shooting has, I believe, served to increase their confidence in themselves, to a considerable degree.

I sent forward to you today an exhaustive study on the installations and defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra. I hope it will be of assistance in deciding what you want done out here. I feel that a comprehensive plan is essential if we are to get coordinated results in the shortest time. This we tried to give you.

You will note that we recommend two full defense battalions over and above the requirements of the Islands now occupied in order to provide two balanced forces to occupy any desired location on short notice. Until such time comes these personnel are so used they can be used to rotate the defense battalions at the various permanently garrisoned islands.

The investigation of an alternate land plane route to the Eastward of the Marshalls and on to Australia has my hearty approval. We may be able to get some quick results from the expedition to Christmas Island sufficient to permit the routing of four-engine land plane bombers from Oahu to Christmas to Suva to Noumea and on to Australia. Additional stepping stones are, of course, highly desirable. In this connection, however, it must be remembered that there are not enough ships now available to handle our own island developments. Without greatly augmented shipping facilities we cannot possibly assume the additional burden for the Army.

My best regards to you always.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy,*
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

MESSAGE NO. 15

SEALED SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE NAVY DEPARTMENT

Form Encl. No. Op-11. Rev. 2892		Address		Message Form- Code
From Chief of Naval Operations. Released by Inspector. Date November 14, 1941.	ACTION	To.	CinCaf (Chief of Staff) Com1 Com2 Com3	Priority Routing Deferred
	INFO.		Com4 Com5	Priority Routing Deferred
TO: One Month. Released by Forwarded by		Signature London CinCaf		Priority Routing Deferred

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Originator fill in date and time for DESPATCH and MAIL DELIVERY.

Date Time OCT